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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 930059-CA 
vs. : 
LARRY D. PERSON : Priority No 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a denial of the Defendant's motion to 
modify a judgment of the Second Judicial District Court, County of 
Weber, State of Utah rendered by the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann 
dated the 9th day of January, 1993. The Defendant was originally 
charged with theft in violation of Section 76-6-404 UCA and 
Section 76-6-412 UCA in that the Defendant allegedly exercised 
unauthorized control over property of a value of less than $250.00 
belonging to Mervyn's Department Store with the purpose to deprive 
the owner thereof, and said Defendant had been twice previously 
convicted of any theft, robbery or burglary with intent to commit 
theft. On the advice of Counsel the Defendant plead guilty to the 
one count of theft, and on the 21st day of October, 1992 was 
sentenced to serve a term of 0 to five years at the Utah State 
Prison. The Defendant, pro se, filed a motion to modify the 
judgment of the Court, which was denied by Judge Glasmann on the 
9th day of January, 1993 as being frivolous. The Defendant filed, 
pro se, an appeal of the said denial of the moticn for modification 
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of judgment, which appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals as 
Case Number 930059-CA. Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled 
appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code annotated, 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953 as amended) and Rule 26 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by denying the 
Defendant's motion for modification of a judgment, wherein the 
Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of 0 to five years at the 
Utah State Prison, for theft of property of a value of less than 
$250.00 where it was alleged that the Defendant had previously been 
convicted of theft. The Court in entering the sentence relied on 
the prosecution's allegations that the Defendant: had twice been 
convicted of theft, robbery or burglary involving intent to commit 
theft as alleged. Counsel for the Defendant did net verify whether 
the Defendant, had in fact, been twice convicted cf theft, robbery 
or burglary involving intent to commit theft. 
Standard of Review Where a Defendant voluntarily enters a 
plea of guilty to a charge, the reviewing court will give 
substantial deference to the decision of the Trial Judge. State v. 
Callahan 866 P 2d 590 (Utah App 1993) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-404 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-412 
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(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this 
chapter shall be punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds 
$1/000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an 
operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at 
the time of the theft; 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of 
another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more 
than $25 0 but not more than $1,00 0 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of 
theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent 
to commit theft; 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, 
gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, 
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or 
poultry; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen was more than $100 but: does not 
exceed $250, or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen was $100 or less. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of 
Subsection 76-6-408(1) may bring an action against any 
person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-408(2) d) for three 
times the amount of actual damages if any sustained by 
the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys 
fees . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant, by information, was charged with theft in 
violation of Section 76-6-404 UCA, wherein it was alleged that he 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of Mervyn,fs, to 
wit: a pair of shoes with a retail value of $55.00. On September 
30, 1992 the Defendant appeared before the Honorable Michael J. 
Glasmann for a pre-trial hearing. The Defendant had previously 
pled not guilty to the information. (T. P. 2) 
At the preliminary hearing, counsel for Defendant indicated to 
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the Court that the Defendant had negotiated a settlement of the 
matter. The Defendant would plead guilty to the charge in 
consideration of which the State, through Mr Decaria, would make no 
sentencing recommendations. The State did, however, reserve the 
right to comment on Mr. Person's prior record. (T. P. 2) 
The Court then asked the Defendant if he understood the 
agreement and asked if he was going to plead guilty as charged to 
a third degree felony, theft. The Court reviewed the State's 
agreement to make no recommendations as to what the Defendant's 
sentence should be, reserving the right to comment on the 
Defendant's previous criminal record, if they chose to do so. The 
Defendant told the Judge he understood that this correctly 
represented the plea bargain, and also that there had been nothing 
else represented to him, which had not been explained to the Court. 
(T. P. 2) 
The Trial Judge explained to the Defendant that he was 
presumed innocent and the State has the burden of proving the 
Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court explained 
that the State must prove that the Defendant committed a theft in 
that he obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the 
property of Mervyn's shoes, to wit: shoes of a value of less than 
$250.00 with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and also that 
the Defendant had been twice previously convicted of any theft, 
robbery or burglary with intent to commit theft. The Defendant 
acknowledged that he knew the elements of the crime that the State 
would have to prove against him. (T. P. 4) 
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The Defendant stated he walked in, put on a pair of shoes and 
walked out. The Court then explained to the Defendant the maximum 
penalty for the third degree felony was zero to five years 
imprisonment in the Utah State prison and up to a $5,000.00 fine. 
(T. P. 5) . The Defendant pled guilty to the third degree felony, 
theft, committed on May 17, 1992. (T. P. 5) The Court accepted the 
Defendant's voluntary plea of guilty (T. P. 6) 
On the 21st day of October, 1992 the Defendant appeared before 
the Court for sentencing. (Sentencing T. P. 2) The Defendant 
requested John Caine of the Weber County Public Defenders 
Association to represent him at the sentencing hearing. (Sentencing 
T. P. 2) Mr. Caine indicated that he had talked to the Defendant 
and explained that the sentencing Judge had limited ability to 
change much of what's was recommended in the pre-sentence report. 
He also explained that the recommendation for prison was a result 
of the Defendant's prior record. (Sentencing T. P. 3) 
The Court in sentencing the Defendant staced: 
"Your past record does box the Court in. Iz will be the 
sentence of the Court that you serve zero ~o five years 
at the State prison. (Sentencing T. P. 5) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court committed reversible error in denying as 
frivolous the Defendant's pro se motion to modify his sentence. 
The Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial 
counsel advised the Defendant to plea guilty :o theft, a third 
degree felony enhanced by two prior convictions of theft, burglary 
or attempted theft, where Counsel did not, in face, verify that the 
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Defendant had been previously convicted twice of the offenses. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO MODIFY HIS SENTENCE 
OF IMPRISONMENT OF ZERO TO FIVE YEARS FOR THEFT OF 
TENNIS SHOES OF A VALUE OF $55.00 
The Defendant filed a motion to modify his sentence of zero to 
five years for theft, a third degree felony under Section 76-6-612 
UCA. The Defendant was charged by information with third degree 
felony, theft in violation of Sections 76-6-404 and 76-6-412 UCA in 
that the Defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over 
the property of Mervyn's Store, to wit: shoes of a value less than 
$250.00 with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and said 
Defendant had been twice previously convicted of any theft, robbery 
or burglary with intent to commit theft. 
The Weber County Public Defenders was appointed as counsel for 
the Defendant and after visiting with counsel, the Defendant pled 
guilty to the charge. In the sentencing hearing the Defendant 
requested that John Caine, a Weber County Public Defender, stand 
with him at sentencing. 
At sentencing the Defendant was again informed that he was 
being sentenced for a third degree felony, theft of shoes. (T. 
Sentencing Hearing P. 2) Further, Mr. Caine stated that, except 
for his prior convictions, he likely would not facing the 
recommendations presented to the sentencing court. (T. Sentencing 
Hearing P. 3) The sentencing Judge also explained to the Defendant 
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that because of his prior record of theft he was boxed in. On 
October 21, 1992 the Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment of 
Zero to Five years at the State prison. (T. Sentencing Hearing P. 
5 . ) The Defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea within 
the statutory time. 
Sometime prior to 9 January, 1993 the Defendant filed a motion 
with the District Court for modification of his judgment, which 
motion was denied on the 9th day of January, 1994. The Defendant 
filed pro se his notice of appeal of the denial of his motion to 
modify the judgment, alleging first, that he did not know at the 
time he entered his plea of guilty that he was being charged with 
a third degree felony. Second, the Defendant stated that he was 
arbitrarily charged with a Third Degree Felony. Third, the 
Defendant alleged that he was charged under the wrong section of 
the Utah Code and that he should only have been charged with petit 
theft, a misdemeanor. Fourth, the Defendant alleged that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel in that counsel did not 
explain to him what he was charged with and the possible sentence 
if he pleaded guilty to the information. Fifth, that Defendant 
said the prior convictions were not proven in court, and that he 
was consequently sentenced for based on charces not proved in 
violation of Due Process of Law. Sixth, the Defendant asserted the 
enhancement penalties cannot be imposed until after he has been 
convicted of theft. Finally, the Defendant states that it is cruel 
and unusual punishment to sentence the Defendant as a habitual 
criminal. 
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For purposes of this appeal, Counsel will address only those 
points raised which bear upon of issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, there being no other substantial arguments, not previously 
settled by case law. The Sixth amendment to the United States 
Constitution stated that " [l}n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to -- have assistance of counsel for 
his defense" U. S, Const. Amend VI This right has interpreted by 
the United States Supreme Court to mean " the right to effective 
assistance of counsel". McMann v. Richardson 397 U. S. 759, 771 n. 
14, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L. Ed 2d 763, 770. The same 
Court has established a two-part test for determining whether 
criminal defendant's have been denied their Sixth Amendment right 
as follows: 
" First, the Defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. The requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. 
The requires showing the counsel's errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable. 
Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 
2052, 2964, 80 L. Ed 2d 674 (1984) Accord State v. 
Tempiin 805 P. 2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) 
In order to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland 
test, a defendant "must show that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness: 466 U. S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. 
However, in making such an analysis, "this court will not 
second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic 
choices, however flawed those choices might appear in 
retrospect. State v. Tenneyson 850 P. 2d 461, 465 (Utah 
App 1992) See also Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 194 S. 
Ct. at 2065. In addition, "[o]nce a defendant proves 
that counsel's performance failed the reasonableness 
test, as measured by prevailing professional standards, 
he can meed the prejudice prong only by showing there is 
a reasonable probability that "but for counsel's 
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unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Tennyson 850 P. 2d at 466 
(quoting Strickland 466 U. S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 
2068) . Where the claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, 
"we must decide whether defendant was deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law." 
Tennyson 850 P. 2d at 466. See also State v. Ellifritz 
835 P. 2d 170, 175 (Utah App 1992) State v. Callahan 
866 P 2d 590 (Utah App 1993) 
This Court in the case of State v. Anderson 797 P. 2d 1114 ( 
Utah App 1990) held that to rely on prior convictions the State 
must furnish copies of the convictions. It is not sufficient for 
the Court to rely on unverified transcripts or records, which may 
or may not be accurate. 
Counsel for the Defendant, in recommending ~hat the Defendant 
plead guilty to a third degree felony, theft relied on a so-called 
"rap sheet", which purportedly showed the Defendant's prior 
convictions. At no time did the trial counsel, in fact, verify 
that the information on the rap sheet was in facz accurate. Trial 
counsel was relying solely on information furnished by the 
prosecutor as to his prior convictions. 
The Defendant's counsel's performance in recommending that the 
Defendant plead guilty to theft, a third degree felony was 
deficient. If the records were inaccurate and the Defendant had 
not twice been previously convicted of either theft, burglary or 
robbery with an intent to commit theft, then the Defendant was not 
guilty of a third degree felony. Absence any evidence showing that 
trial counsel in fact verified the prior convictions he should not 
have recommended the Defendant plead guilty to uhe information as 
charged. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial judge committed reversible error in denying the 
Defendant's motion for modification of his sentence, where the 
Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in making his 
plea of guilty to a third degree felony, theft with two prior 
convictions of theft, burglary, or robbery with intent to commit 
theft, where said counsel had not verified that the Defendant had 
twice been so convicted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8 day of June, 1995 
Stephen A. Laker 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed one true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing Brief to the Attorney General's Office, 23 6 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid 
this £> day of June, 1995. 
Stephen A. Laker ^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
10 
ADDENDUM 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Larry D. Person, case 
0449- Time for Pre-Trial, and our trial having been set for 
October the 9th. 
MR- FROERER: Your Honor, we have a negotiated 
settlement of this matter. Mr. Person is going to plead 
guilty to the charge. The State, through Mr. Decaria, is 
going to make no sentencing recommendation, though he does 
reserve the right to comment on Mr. Person's prior record. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. FROERER: That's it. 
THE COURT: Is that the State's understanding? 
MR. DAINES: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Person, you have heard that 
representation, that you are going to plead guilty as charged 
to the third degree felony, theft. That the State agrees to 
make no recommendation as to what your sentence should be, but] 
does reserve the right to comment on your previous criminal 
record if they so choose. You understand that that is the 
plea bargain? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Is there anything else that's been 
represented to you that has not been disclosed here? 
MR. PERSON; No. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have a clear mind 
today? 
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right to appeal from anything that might have occurred during 
that trial? 
MR. PERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: In this case you are presumed innocent. 
The State has the burden of proving your guilty, as I have 
said, beyond a reasonable doubt. The State has alleged, and 
must prove in this case, that you committed a theft. That youj 
obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property 
of Mervyn's Shoes, to wit, shoes, of a value less than $250. OCJ 
with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. And that you 
have been twice previously convicted of any theft, robbery or 
burglary with intent to commit theft. 
Is that correct, Mr. Daines? 
MR. DAINES: Yes, that's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that those are the 
elements the State would have to prove against you? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty in this case 
because you in fact committed the theft? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, I am. 
THE COURT: Tell the Court what happened briefly if 
you would. 
MR. PERSON: Well, I walked in and put on a pair of 
shoes and walked out. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that the 
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maximum penalty for the third degree felony is zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison and up to $5,000.00 in fines? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: You understand that notwithstanding 
whatfs been said or represented to you, that it is up to the 
Court to sentence you. And the Court can sentence you to the 
maximum penalty? 
MR. PERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. At this time do you need any morej 
time to think about this, or to consult with your attorney? 
MR. PERSON; No, I don't. 
THE COURT: As to the third degree felony, theft, 
alleged to have been committed on May 17, 1992, how do you 
plead? 
MR. PERSON: Guilty. 
MR. FROERER: I do have a statement, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
MR. FROERER: We do have a statement. 
THE COURT: Very good. If ycu will approach the 
Bench, Mr. Froerer. 
Your attorney, Mr. Person, has provided me with a 
Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty. Has your) 
attorney been over that with you? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, he has. 
THE COURT: He explained it to you? 
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MR. PERSON: Yes, he did. 
THE COURT: It appears to contain the signature of 
Larry Person, Is that your signature on page five? 
MR. PERSON; Yes, it is. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court will find that you 
knowingly and voluntarily entered your plea of guilty. 
I want to advise you, as I have previous Defendants, that} 
you have 3 0 days from today within which to bring a Motion to 
Withdraw your Plea of Guilty. It doesn't mean the Court will 
grant it, but if you donft bring it within that 3 0 days, it i^ 
not timely. Do you understand that? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: All right. This matter needs to be set 
for sentencing. The Probation Office looking for three weeks?| 
PROBATION OFFICER: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. FROERER: Your Honor, he is requesting sooner 
than that. 
THE COURT: Let me ask this question: Do we have 
any—have you ever been on probation before this Court 
previous to this? 
MR. PERSON: Yes, I have. 
THE COURT: How long ago? 
MR. PERSON: Quite a while ago. I have been on 
parole, though. 
MR. DAINES: That's what partially complicates this 
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THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Larry Person, case 
0449 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I was prepared to go on Mr. 
Person, but he indicates he wanted to talk to John about it, 
too, so we will have to pass that. 
THE COURT: This is on for sentencing. We will pass 
that, 
* * * 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Caine, did ycu have a chance to talk 
to Mr. Person? 
MR. CAINE: I did. We can do that now. 
THE COURT: Case 0449, State vs. Larry Person. 
MR. CAINE: This is Mr. Person. This is actually 
Mr. Froerer and Mr. Miles1 case, but I have — if you go back to 
the beginning on page 4, I have known Mr. Persons since about 
1979. So I have had something to do with the rest of those 
cases, so he wanted me to stand up here with him. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, this is the time for 
sentencing on the third degree felony, theft, charge. Is 
there any legal reason why sentence should not be imposed? 
MR. CAINE: There is none. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to speak to this matter? 
MR. CAINE: Yes, in this respect, Judge, I have 
talked with Larry and indicated to him that you have very 
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limited ability to change much of what's recommended here in 
this report. And that's primarily based upon his prior 
record. 
The one thing that's a little troubling to me frankly is 
that if you go back to Larry's release from prison the last 
time, which was in May of 1990, he was basically on intensive 
supervision type parole from that point in time until June of 
1992. That was actually the best period of time that he has 
had probably in the last 15 years. I was a little 
disappointed that Ms. Vincent did not detail that in a little 
more detail in her report because in effect he had no 
violations in that period; did well, worked, and was doing 
pretty well. 
What happened is, which has been a pattern in his life 
unfortunately, this locks it right in, he is obviously 
starting to use heroin again. And then we have the theft. 
That's been Larry's Achilles' heel unfortunately is his use of 
heroin. The theft is a $55.00 pair of sneakers, which as I 
have indicated to him if he were standing here the first time, 
we wouldn't be standing here because that would be a 
misdemeanor. But he is burdened of course with is past. 
The problem is he will be sent back down to prison, if 
that's the sentence, given a parole date, because he is not 
the kind of guy that does badly down there, and the problem 
still doesn't get cured. And that is, he has a substance 
3 
5 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
If the person wants to go through any kind of a rehab pi v. 
at the prison, those are made available to him. For thoi 
people who want to get off those substances down there, I 
think they have effective programs, 
MR. CAINE: And let me just say what Mr. Daines 
theoretically is true. The problem is that the programs 
still obviously administered within the confines of the 
prison. It is not a situation where you get released, 
there are some problems incumbent in that sort of situat^ 
because of the drug problem that exists at the prison. 7 
not the most conducive place to do it. But he is correct 
there are programs available. I just con't think they a: 
very successful. 
THE COURT: Mr. Person, I car. imagine you might 
better under intensive supervision because you are being 
followed and watched closely. That may be an incentive t; 
causes you to behave better. And that may be why you pe: 
better under that situation. 
Unfortunately, our society is not set up for you to 
intensively supervised the rest of your life to avoid sli; 
back into the heroin problem or committing thefts. 
Your past record does box the Court in. It will be • 
sentence of the Court that you serve zero to five years a; 
State Prison. And that you pay restitution in the amount 
$55.00. It will be the further order of the Court that y 
